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NATIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
LAWRENCE

M. FRANKELt

At a time when representative democracy is spreading across the
globe, it seems ironic that the capital of the "free world" is a city in
which over 600,000 residents have no effective voice in the national
government that rules over them. In spite of the fact that the
residents of the city of Washington in the District of Columbia are
United States citizens, pay federal taxes, and are under the direct
control of the national government, they are deprived of the right
to vote for representatives in Congress and are thus, effectively
disenfranchised. 1 Despite dozens of proposals and a tremendous
amount of debate, the American citizens who are geographically
closest to the heart of federal power remain politically furthest from
it, as they have been for the past 190 years.
The media's focus on the District of Columbia's recent drive for
statehood has attracted national attention to the issue of representation for the District.2 Statehood bills have been introduced in
Congress.8

In November 1990, the District elected two "shadow

t B.A. 1988, Cornell University; M.A. in Public Policy & Management 1991, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Ed Baker for his thoughtful suggestions
on early drafts of this Comment.
1 The District does have one non-voting delegate in the House of Representatives.
See 2 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1988). However, this does not provide District residents with an
effective voice equal to (or even remotely close to) that of U.S. citizens in the other
fifty states who elect two voting senators and one voting representative to the national
legislature.
2 See e.g., Mashek, Another Uphill BattleforJackson: D.C.Statehood, Boston Globe,
June 10,1991, Nation section, at 3, col. 1; Rally, Forum to Urge Statehood,Wash. Times,
May 17,1991, at B2; Wilgoren, Norton Plansto ProposeD.C. StatehoodLegislation, Wash.
Post, May 15, 1991, at C3, col. 1; Nichols, Statehood Backer Withholds Tax USA Today,
April 16, 1991, at 2A, col. 4.
See, e.g., Gannett News Service, Mar. 9, 1990 (LExIs, Nexis library, Omni file)
(stating that Delegate Fauntroy and Sen. Kennedy had introduced similar statehood
bills); 136 CONG. REc. S6466 (daily ed. Jun. 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy
introducing statehood bill); 133 CONG. REC. S3964 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1987) (same);
133 CONG. Rzc. H1410 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1987) (statement of Delegate Fauntroy
introducing statehood bill).
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senators" to pressure Congress for statehood. 4 This recent
initiative is only the latest in a series of attempts by District
residents, and their supporters, to gain representation. 5 Despite
these efforts, it appears that the drive for D.C. statehood is unlikely
to succeed in the near future. Neither house of Congress has
approved a statehood bill, and given the vehement opposition of
some representatives and senators, particularly Republicans, 6 it is
unlikely that either house will approve such a bill. Although
resistance to District statehood is largely political in nature,
opposition also stems from constitutional and "public policy"
concerns. 7 Foremost among these concerns is that statehood would
eliminate a separate federal district under exclusive congressional
jurisdiction. Such a district is perceived as either constitutionally
required,8 or is thought of, by Congress and the American public,
9
as highly desirable for historical, traditional, and practical reasons.
4 See Harvey, Statehood Lobbyists to Climb Hill With Nothing From City in Pockets,
Wash. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at B6, col. 1. The two elected "shadow senators" arejesse
Jackson and Florence Pendleton. In addition, a "shadow" House representative,
Charles Moreland, was also elected. See id. This "shadow" delegation has no real
power and has been granted virtually no resources to accomplish its assigned task of
lobbying Congress for D.C. statehood. The District is providing them with no money
for salary or staff and, of course, they have no vote in Congress. However, in electing
"shadow senators," the District is attempting to follow in the footsteps of six other
territories which elected "shadow senators" prior to achieving statehood. See id.
5 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H404 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1990) ("If the District wants
to have two senators, then let it go back to Maryland where it came from.") (comment
of Rep. McEwen, (R)). Given the demographic makeup of the District and its
tendency to vote overwhelmingly Democratic in Presidential elections, Republicans
in Congress undoubtedly fear that any representatives or senators from the District
would be Democrats and further add to that party's majority in both Houses. See
Devroy & Melton, President Opposes Statehood, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1990, at Al, col.
1, A22, col. 3 (relating statement of Republican Party strategist Ed Rollins that
"Republicans do not favor statehood for the District [because] you're going to get two
liberal Democrats [in the Senate] and keep getting them for the next 100 years"); D.C.
Statehood Backed, Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1987, at 20, col.1 (noting that all four
Republicans in a House Committee voted against a statehood bill). The allegation is
often made that opposition to representation for the District is based on the "four
toos": the District is "too liberal, too urban, too black or too Democratic." 124
CONG. REc. 26,345 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see alsoJackson, The Casefor
America's 51st State-New Columbia, Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1990, at 11, col. 2
(reviewing the "four toos").
7 See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments against
statehood).
8 This constitutional argument is based primarily on the "exclusive jurisdiction"
clause in article I, section 8, clause 17 and on the twenty third amendment. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. amend. XXIII. The argument is discussed in detail
below. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 48, 104-07 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for
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Although lack of national representation for the District is a critical
problem and a major flaw in our democratic system, statehood may
not be thought an acceptable solution.
This Comment proposes an alternative solution to the problem
of District disenfranchisement, one which is more politically
feasible, does not eliminate the separate federal city under exclusive
congressional jurisdiction, and is more within the spirit and intent
of the Constitution than is statehood. Under this solution Congress
can, and should, pass legislation granting the District two senators
and one representative in Congress; in effect, Congress should pass
a law requiring that the District be treated as a state for purposes of
representation. A variant of this solution was attempted in 1978
when Congress approved a constitutional amendment which would
have given the District two senators and a representative, however,
the amendment was never ratified.1 0
It has usually been assumed that a constitutional amendment
would be necessary for the District to receive its own congressional
representatives." This Comment challenges that assumption and
suggests that the conventional argument upon which it is basedthat article I and the seventeenth amendment prohibit District
representation on the basis that it is not a "state" and only "states"
can have congressional representation-is without merit.1 2 Furmaintaining a separate federal district, including the desire to avoid a state
government having influence, or the appearance of influence, over a federal
government located within its midst).
'0 The amendment died when only sixteen states ratified it. Thirty-eight were
necessary for the amendment to succeed. See S. MARKMAN, STATEHOOD FOR THE
DISTRCT OF COLUMBIA 3 n.1 (1988).
11 See Franchino, The Constitutionalityof Home Rule and NationalRepresentationfor
the District of Columbia, 46 CEO. L.J. 377, 407-08 (1958) ("It would appear that
constitutional amendment is the sole method of providing national franchise for
District citizens, and the proposals have been in that form." (footnote omitted)). The
1978 proposed amendment continued the pattern of congressional attempts to
correct the problem of District disenfranchisement by amendment. If Congress
thought the District could be granted congressional representation through
legislation, it would have, at some point, attempted this, rather than consistently
pursuing the more difficult process of constitutional amendment. The one notable
exception to the assumption that constitutional amendment is necessary to provide
the District with representation is Raven-Hansen, CongressionalRepresentationfor the
Districtof Columbia: A ConstitutionalAnalysis,12 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 167 (1975), which
challenged "the hitherto unchallenged assumption that the Constitution denies
citizens of the District representation" and suggested that the District might already
be treated as a state, presumably byjudicial action. Id. at 168. Raven-Hansen's article
is discussed further below at infra note 101.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII. This argument is discussed (and
the relevant clauses are quoted) below. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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thermore, it is argued that several provisions of the Constitution
suggest that Congress should be permitted to treat the District as a
state for purposes of representation. In particular, the longstanding
denial of representation to the citizens of the District appears to
constitute due process and equal protection violations which
Congress has the constitutional power to remedy by enacting
appropriate legislation. A legislative grant of representation to the
District would be entirely consistent with the spirit and letter of the
Constitution and would remedy a wrong that has gone uncorrected
for almost two centuries.
Part I of this Comment focuses on the problem of lack of
national representation for the District of Columbia. Section IA
examines the current situation, how it has come about, and why it
is unacceptable. Section IB provides an overview of the proposed
solutions to the problem-including statehood-and illustrates why
each is unsatisfactory. Part II then elaborates on the solution
advocated by this Comment: a legislative grant of congressional
representation to the District. Section IIA examines the advantages
of this solution. Section IIB argues that, contrary to conventional
belief, this solution is constitutional.
Section IIB is further
subdivided into two parts which attempt to show that: (1) "state" is
an inherently flexible concept, not defined in the Constitution and
varying in meaning depending on the context, and (2) Congress has
the constitutional power to treat the District as a state for purposes
of representation.1 3 Finally, section IIC addresses other constitutional and policy challenges to the legislative solution; each is found
to be unpersuasive. In short, the legislative solution is not only
constitutional, but also far more appealing, from both a constitutional and political perspective, than any other approach to the

problem.

13 The conventional way to approach most constitutional issues is to first show
that Congress has the constitutional power and then that there is no constitutional
provision prohibiting congressional action. However, in this case, in order to obtain
a better understanding of congressional power (particularly with regard to defining
"states") it is useful to first look at the possible prohibition on congressional action
which results from the constitutional provisions regarding "states."
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I. STATING THE PROBLEM AND ASSESSING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Status Quo: What It Is, How It Has Come About, and
Why It Is Unacceptable

Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution
gives Congress the power "[tio exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular State, and the Acceptance
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United
States." 14 In accordance with this provision, Maryland and Virginia both ceded land to the U.S. government; the cessions were
accepted by Congress in July of 1790.15 On the first Monday in

December 1800, the District became the official seat of the national
government and on that date, the citizens of the District became
6
disenfranchised-a situation that persists to the current day.1
The District of Columbia is a distinct political entity. Its
population of approximately 630,000 residents exceeds that of three
states. 1 7 The vast majority of the District's residents are United
States citizens who pay federal taxes. These taxes are, in per capita
terms, more than the national average and in absolute terms,
18
greater than the total taxes paid by the residents of eight states.
District residents have served, and continue to serve, in the military
with distinction. 19 Residents of the District are subject to federal
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 17. This clause is usually referred to as either the
"exclusive legislation" or "exclusive jurisdiction" clause.

15 See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 173. The Virginia portion was "retroceded" back to that state in 1846. See Franchino, supra note 11, at 378-82 (describing the
history of the Virginia retrocession).
16 See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 174.
17
Alaska, Wyoming, and Vermont all have a smaller population than the District.
See THE WORLD ALMANAC 540 (M. Hoffman ed. 1989). Of course, the numbers
involved are not the real problem. The problem of a defined class of citizens being
deprived of a voice in national affairs on the basis of geography would exist even if
the population of the District was smaller than each and every state's. SeeJ. BEST,
NATIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4-5 (1984) ("Issues of

fundamental justice should not turn on the numbers of the people involved.").
18 SeeJackson, supra note 6, at 11, col. 3. In 1989, District residents paid $1.38
billion in federal taxes. Per capita, this figure was $500 above the national average-a
fact which should not be surprising when it is noted that per capita income for
District residents is well above the national average. See id. Again, however, numbers
are not what is critical. "The amount of taxes paid-whether it be greater or smaller
than any or all of the states-is irrelevant. It is the fact of paying taxes without
representation in the taxing body that is relevant." J. BEST, supra note 17, at 5.
19 See 124 CONG. REc. 26,346 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1978) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy pointing out that the casualty level in the Vietnam War was higher for
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laws. In short, residents of the District have the same responsibilities as the residents of any state in the nation and yet simply
because of geography and historical accident,20 they are controlled
by a national government in which they have no effective representation. Despite general recognition of this problem and vocal
support for a solution among members of Congress, as well as
academic commentators, 2 1 concern about the issue has not been
sufficient to translate a proposed solution into reality.
There are a number of problems associated with lack of
representation for the District, the combination of which make the
status quo unacceptable. The most basic problem, clearly reflected
in the arguments of many advocates of D.C. representation, is the
"fairness problem": it is fundamentally unfair and unjust for several
hundred thousand full-fledged, tax-paying American citizens to have
no voice in running the national government. 22 It should strike
one as hypocritical that a government which adds vocal and
economic support to movements for representative democracy
abroad is centered in a city whose citizens are shut out from
representative democracy at the national level.
residents of the District than that for ten states).
20 As explained below, disenfranchisement of District residents was not
intentional, but rather was the unfortunate result of the founding fathers' establishment of an area of exclusive federal control while inadvertently failing to provide for
direct national representation for the area. See infranotes 103-15 and accompanying
text.
21 See, e.g., J. BEST, supra note 17, at 2-10 (describing the case for national
representation); Franchino, supra note 11, at 377 (stating that "basic American
political theory supports national and local franchise for District citizens"); RavenHansen, supranote 11, at 167 ("At the end of a decade marked by congressional and
judicial activism in extending the franchise, it seems to many ironic that Congress and
the Supreme Court should sit amidst several hundred thousand American citizens
who are denied representation in the national legislature."); 124 CONG. REc. 26,344
(1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy that District disenfranchisement "is an anachronism that defies justice and denies one of the basic and most cherished rights of
representative government for the people of the Nation's capital"); id. at 26,375
(statement of Sen. Hatch, an opponent of most actual attempts to enfranchise the
District, that he believes "they should have voting rights in the District").
22 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 26,369 (1978) (statement of Sen. Thurmond that he
favors representation because "[iut is just not fair, that ... more than 700,000
American citizens do not have the right to elect representatives to Congress");
Jackson, Foreword: The State of New Columbia-A CallforJustice and Freedom; 39 CATH.
U.L. REV. 307, 310 (1990) (referring to the problem of District non-representation as
"the primary... social justice question of our times"); see also supra note 21 (listing
statements in support of enfranchisement, several of which express the "fairness"
rationale either explicitly or implicitly).
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One corollary to the "fairness issue" is the "taxation without
representation" problem. This concept, a rallying cry of the
American revolution, appears directly contravened by the fact that
District residents must pay federal taxes levied by Congress without
being represented in that body.23 The disenfranchisement of
more than 600,000 District residents is also contrary to basic
democratic theory and to the republican form of government
established by the Constitution. 24 Furthermore, the fundamental
principle that a just and legitimate government must derive power
from the consent of the governed is contradicted in the case of the
District, as District residents have dearly signified their dissatisfac25
tion with their lack of representation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States
Constitution itself suggests that the status quo may be unacceptable.
Disenfranchisement of District residents may be a violation of
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection and due process
rights. 26 Given the fundamental status of the vote under the
Constitution, 27 complete and permanent deprivation of the
franchise to a definable subsection of the U.S. citizenry constitutes
a serious problem requiring remedy.
B. Proposed Solutions (and Their Respective Flaws)
There has been no shortage of solutions proposed to deal with
the problem of D.C. disenfranchisement, or for that matter, of
resolutions in Congress attempting to remedy the situation. In fact,
in the past 190 years, "the movement to provide national representation for the District of Columbia... [has] produced more than
23See Franchino, supra note 11, at 378 ("It has been argued with great force that
the principle of'no taxation without representation' is such a basic tenet ofAmerican
political philosophy that it imposes a mandate upon Congress to afford representation to District citizens.").
24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(describing the confederation established by the Constitution as one "founded on
republican principles, and composed of republican members"); id. No. 39, at 241
(defining republican government as one which "derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people").
2 The District has, in fact, passed a referendum calling for statehood. See infra
note 76.
26 These guarantees are contained in both the fifth and fourteenth amendments;

the apparent violations are discussed below at infra notes 129-53 and accompanying
text.
27 See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing case law holding that
the right to vote is a "fundamental right").
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150 congressional resolutions." 2s While the failure of these
attempts can largely be attributed to politics,2 9 contributing also
to their failure has been legitimate disagreement concerning which
solution is most appropriate from a constitutional and public policy
standpoint.
For the most part, the proposed solutions fall into one of three
general categories: (i) a constitutional amendment granting the
District representation while maintaining its status as a "non-state"
federal city under exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, (ii) allowing
the District to become part of Maryland, either in full or simply for
purposes of representation (commonly referred to as "retrocession"), and (iii) complete statehood for the District, the solution
most in the public eye today. Each of these solutions has inherent
political and/or constitutional flaws which have prevented implementation.
1. Constitutional Amendment Granting Congressional
Representation
Congress first considered a constitutional amendment granting
national representation to the District in 1888.30 Since then,
numerous other amendments have been proposed, varying not only
in form but also in the number and type of representatives to be
given the District.31 In 1978, Congress approved, by the necessary
two-thirds vote in both houses, a proposed amendment mandating
that the District be considered a state for purposes of representation.3 2 In order to be ratified, the amendment required approval
by three-fourths of the state legislatures within the seven year
period allotted by Congress. Unfortunately, it never even came
33
close to success.
28

j.

BEST,

supra note 17, at

14.

2 As previously stated, Republicans have a motive to resist enfranchising the
District since its congressional delegation would most likelybe completely Democratic. See supra note 6. Furthermore, neither Democrats nor Republicans in either the

Congress or the state legislatures have any electoral incentive to push for representation for the District since District voters have no power to either vote for or against
them.

o For the text of this proposed amendment, see Franchino, supranote 11, at 408.
s For the text of several of these proposals and references to several more, see
id. at 408-09 & nn.74-78.
32 For a copy of the text of the proposed amendment, seeJ. BEST, supra note 17,
at 25.
s See supra note 10.
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Undoubtedly, there were many reasons the amendment failed,
probably almost as many as there were states which failed to ratify
it. Many of the arguments asserted then against statehood are the
same as those asserted now.M In spite of the fact that a constitutional amendment would seem, by its very nature, to obviate any
constitutional problems, at least one scholar argued that the
proposed amendment was unconstitutional.3 5 Yet, behind the
intellectual arguments, there was a very practical political problem
which in all likelihood doomed the proposed amendment. While
representatives and senators had little to gain electorally from a
D.C. representation amendment (and, in fact, this might explain
why it took so long for Congress to pass one), the state legislatures
considering the amendment had even less incentive to pass one.
State legislators never had to answer to District residents for their
actions, and never had any real reason to care about an issue which
had little to do with running their respective states. In many states,
the proposed amendment never even made it to the floor of the
legislature.3 6 While it was difficult for District residents to get
Congress to recognize their disenfranchisement and to attempt to
remedy it, it was practically impossible to get the states to show any
concern. Although the Constitution delegates to the federal
government many problems which the states are unlikely to have
enough concern and political will to remedy, D.C. representation
37
has unfortunately not been thought to be one of these.
34 See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against
statehood).
35 SeeJ. BEST, supra note 17, at 43-51. Professor Best's book, written in the midst
of the ratification battle, is devoted to the thesis that the proposed amendment was
unconstitutional, at least in part on the ground that it violated the article V clause
stating that no non-consenting state can be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate. Thus, Best claimed, unless all the states consented, the District could not
constitutionally receive representation through this amendment. See id. at 43. Since
this argument is potentially applicable to the legislative solution advocated by this
Comment, as well as to the proposed amendment, it is discussed (and rejected) below.
See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
36 SeeJ. BEsT, supra note 17, at 1.
7 Article III, section 2 of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to
adjudicate disputes between citizens of different states mainly to avoid the problem
of one state not having enough incentive to treat a citizen of another state fairly. The
fourteenth amendment places the protection of certain individual rights in the hands
of the federal government due to the post-Civil War fear that some states would not
uphold the equal protection and due process rights of all their citizens. Article IV,
section 3 gives Congress, rather than the states, the right to admit new states to the
Union, presumably at least in part because of the fear that state legislatures might not
have sufficient incentive to want to admit new states. In fact, states might deliberately
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What the 1978-1985 amendment effort does suggest, however,
is that there was considerable support in Congress (two-thirds in
both houses) for resolving the problem of District non-representation by granting the District representation as if it were a state,
while preserving exclusive federal jurisdiction over the District. The
effort also made clear that were the states entrusted with ratification, they would place provincial concerns (such as dilution of their
own congressional representation) over the fundamental individual
rights of District residents. Thus, if the federal government wishes
to resolve the problem of District representation in a manner it
finds satisfactory, it must do so on its own, under a proper exercise
of federal power without reliance on the states.
2. Retrocession
The second commonly advocated solution for the problem of
D.C. representation is that of "retrocession."3 8 According to this
solution, District residents would vote for a representative in the
House and would also be able to vote in the Maryland Senate races.
There are many variants of this solution: some call for either all or
most of the District to once again become part of Maryland, others
call for District residents to simply be considered part of Maryland
for voting purposes.
As early as 1803, a bill was introduced in Congress calling for
retrocession of the District to Maryland and Virginia to prevent
"political slavery."3 9 As recently as 1990, House members introduced bills calling for District residents to vote in Maryland Senate

seek to prevent new states from entering the Union as they would dilute existing
congressional representation. (This may also be one reason why the states rejected
congressional representation for the District.) The bottom line is that, in general,
where the framers thought an issue was one of federal concern and one where the
states, due to their more narrow concerns, did not have sufficient incentive to act
appropriately, the issue was delegated to the federal government. In fact, the
principle reason for establishing a federal district was to provide an area of federal
control in which the territory and residents would not be subject to the whims of a
particular state or states. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, resort to the amendment proc.ss to provide for D.C. representation did result in
the residents of the federal district, under the exclusive jurisdiction and protection
of the federal government, being denied a basic right at the hands of the states.
ss Retrocession seems to be the favorite solution of some academics. See e.g., J.
BEsT, supra note 17, at 77-83 (describing retrocession as the "constitutionally elegant
solution"); Franchino, supra note 11, at 413-14 & n.86 (arguing for partial retrocession and providing a proposed text for a retrocession bill).
39 See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 177 (citing 12 ANNALs OF CONG. 499

(1803)).
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races and elect their own representative to the House 40 or, for
complete retrocession of the District to Maryland (except for a tiny
enclave of federal buildings which would remain under federal
control). 41 This solution is popular, in part, because of a solid
historical precedent. In 1846, upon the approval of Congress and
the people of Alexandria County (the part of the District originally
ceded by Virginia), Alexandria County ceased to be part of the
District of Columbia and once again became part of Virginia,
thereby restoring to its citizens full voting rights.42
Although most people familiar with the situation assume that a
constitutional amendment would not be required for retrocession
to take place, 43 there is some debate as to what actually is required. At least one commentator argues that the Constitution now
mandates a separate federal district, and thus, full retrocession
would require a constitutional amendment since it would eliminate
such a district. 44 Many of the proposals for retrocession may
implicitly or explicitly recognize this problem in that they call for
the federal government to maintain control over a small enclave of
federal buildings. 45 However, the idea of a federal enclave does
not solve the constitutional problems implicated by the twenty-third
amendment (which incorporated the District into the presidential
election process). 46 The new, vastly reduced, federal district is
likely to have very, very few residents, and yet, under the twentythird amendment, these individuals would still be entitled to three
40

SeeJenkins, Parris Bill Would Let D.C. Vote in MarylandSenate Race, Wash. Post,

Mar. 7, 1990, at D1, col. 2.
41 See 136 CONG. REc. H646 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (introduction by Congressman Regula of H.R. 4195).
42
See Franchino, supra note 11, at 378-82.
45
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (describing attempts at retrocession through legislation); Franchino, supra note 11, at 384-88 (arguing that
retrocession by statute would be constitutional).
44 See J. BEST, supra note 17, at 70-71 (arguing that art. I, § 8, cl. 17, (the
"exclusive legislation" clause), and the twenty-third amendment (granting the District
three electoral votes in presidential elections) give the District a constitutional status
which can only be altered by constitutional amendment); see also supra text
accompanying note 14 (quoting the language of the "exclusive legislation" clause);
infra note 46 (quoting relevant language of the twenty-third amendment).
45 See, e.g., Franchino, supra note 11, at 414 (recommending that "to avoid the
constitutional objections to total retrocession the act should retain a minimum of
territory to preserve the identity of the Capital City").
4' The twenty-third amendment grants to the District "[a] number of electors of
President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no
event more than the least populous State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIII.
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electoral votes in presidential elections. 4 7 This result seems a bit

unfair, if not ridiculous.
Regardless of whether retrocession without amendment is
constitutional, it does appear that full retrocession, and probably

partial retrocession as well, is contrary to the more than twohundred-year-old notion that the United States should have a
federal district under exclusive federal jurisdiction and free of the

control of any state. Even if many of the original reasons why a
separate federal district was originally established are no longer

applicable (for instance, it is unlikely that the federal government
needs a separate federal district in order to protect itself), and even
if retrocession is technically constitutional (although, as discussed

above, it may not be), there is a widespread belief that the nation's
capital should belong to the nation as a whole and should not be a

part of any particular state. 48

In short, retrocession, even if

politically and constitutionally feasible, is not in accordance with

tradition, history, and a common intuitive sense of what our capital
should be.

Another very substantial problem with retrocession is that many
of those most concerned with the problem of D.C. representation
are opposed to retrocession.

This is evidenced by the fact that

District residents have focused their recent energies on statehood, 4 9 and when retrocession has been raised as a possibility, it
has been met with a rather negative response. 50 The reasons for
47 It seems unlikely that the boundaries of the federal enclave could be so drawn
to exclude all permanent residents. Not only would the remaining residents have
three electoral votes giving them a grossly disproportionate impact on presidential
elections, but they would still not have congressional representation. If a federal
enclave could somehow be established with no residents, there would be no one to
elect the three electoral college representatives as the twenty-third amendment
requires. This raises the same constitutionality problem suggested by Professor Best.
See supra note 44.
48 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 26,384 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh that "[t]his city
belongs to Indiana, to Rhode Island, to Virginia; it belongs to the whole United States
of America"); J. BEST, supra note 17, at 65 (stating that a separate federal city is a
tradition and traditions "are not to be lightly cast aside").
49 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
'o See e.gJenkins,supra note 40, at DI, col. 2 (noting opposition to the Parris bill
(described supra at note 40 and accompanying text) from several different sources
including the mayor of the District and a member of Congress); Schneider & Melton,
Jackson Chides Schaferfor Offer to Annex Distric4 Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1990, at B5, col.
5 (notingJesseJackson's vehement opposition to retrocession); Schrag, The Futureof
Districtof Columbia HomeRule 39 CATH. U.L. REv. 311,319-20 & n.53 (1990) (noting
that since District residents have approved a statehood initiative, they are likely to be
uninterested in retrocession, and reporting a survey of Maryland state legislators
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the opposition to retrocession are fairly obvious. Under retrocession, the District's residents would have a small role in selecting
Maryland's two senators (since the population of Maryland dwarfs
that of the District), while under other proposed solutions (such as
statehood or the 1978 proposed amendment), the District's
residents would, themselves, elect two senators, who would be
responsible solely to them. Thus, retrocession would give the
District much less political power than any of the alternative
solutions. The fact that the District has been a distinct political
entity, with its own laws and government for almost two hundred
years, suggests that its residents have a valid argument when they
contend that the problem of non-representation should not be
solved in a manner that robs them of their distinct political identity
in order artificially to dilute their political influence. Article IV,
section 3 of the Constitution supports this reasoning, even if it may
not technically be applicable to the District. The clause providing
that "[no] State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress," 51 suggests that joining
distinct political and geographic entities in order to reduce their
political influence and representation in the Senate is contrary to
the principles of this republic. Regardless of the strength of these
arguments, however, as a practical matter the opposition of the
District's residents and political leaders to retrocession make it
impractical as a solution to the representation dilemma.
3. Statehood
Recently, the solution which has received the most attention,
and the most support from advocates of D.C. national representation, has been that of statehood. If the District were to be admitted
to the Union as a full-fledged state, it would receive two senators
and a number of representatives proportionate to its population (at
the moment, one). It is not entirely clear what would be constitushowing overwhelming resistance to the idea of the District rejoining their state); 136
CONG. REc. S6469 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy referring to
retrocession as an unacceptable "half-hearted initiative[]").
51 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. As discussed below, the District can and has been

treated as a state for certain purposes. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
If the District were to be treated as a state for purposes of this constitutional
provision, retrocession would, in fact, be unconstitutional without the consent of both
Maryland and the District.
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tionally required for statehood. Yet, the proponents of the idea
contend that simple legislation would be sufficient and some, in
fact, have introduced such legislation in Congress on a number of
occasions. 52 Despite the recent push, however, statehood legislation has never gotten very far nor is it likely to be passed in the near
future. 53
A wide variety of arguments have been used against the
statehood alternative. Some are frivolous, such as the argument
that the American flag has no room for a fifty-first star.54 Others,
although seemingly more substantial, prove to be not much of an
obstacle, particularly when weighed against the fundamental right
of District residents to enfranchisement and congressional representation. 55 Several constitutional and public policy objections to
statehood, however, do have some merit and may suggest that
statehood is not the most appropriate way to enfranchise the
District.
Transforming the District into a state would eliminate congressional "exclusive jurisdiction" over the District provided for in
article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution. Since this
provision does not absolutely require a federal district, but rather,
simply gives Congress power over what "may... become the Seat
52 See supra note 3.
53 The furthest such legislation has gotten is passage in a House Committee. See
D.C. Statehood Backed, Chicago Tribune,June 4, 1987, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (reporting that
a statehood bill passed the District of Columbia Committee by a vote of six to five).
54 See Dukakis Win CouldHelp Make WashingtonD.C. 51st U.S. State, Reuters, Sept.
7, 1988 (LEXIs, Nexis library, Currnt file).
" These include arguments such as the District does not have enough land area
to be a state and that the District has too much of a single interest constituency (i.e.
federal employees) to be a state. As to the former, nothing in the Constitution or in
our basic system of values and traditions places any limit on how big a geographic
entity must be to be a state; there is no reason that 600,000 U.S. citizens should be
deprived of their right to representation because the cumulative area of the land on
which they live is smaller than that of the smallest state. Since the latter argument,
concerning the District havinga single-interest constituency, applies to congressional
representation without statehood as well as to the statehood option, it is discussed
below. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. These arguments are, for the
most part, either explicitly or implicitly political-they reflect the beliefs of their
advocates that the residents of the District should not have representation on a par
with those of the other states because of the effects that D.C. representation would
cause. See e.g., S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at xi (foreword by Hal Stratton
complaining that "[t]he interests of the constituents of a D.C. senator would require
the senator constantly to vote for bigger government, for more taxes, and more
intrusions into the States' sphere of authority"); see also supra note 6 (noting that
Republicans may fear that the District will consistently elect two Democratic
Senators).
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of the Government of the United States," 56 it is unclear whether
a legislative act transforming the District into a state (and thereby
eliminating congressional control over it) would violate this
constitutional provision. Certainly the argument can be made that
it would.5 7
Somewhat more convincingly, legislatively created statehood
might be unconstitutional in that it would nullify the twenty-third
amendment. 58 An argument can be made that a legislative act
turning a constitutional provision into "a dead letter" should be
considered unconstitutional.5 9
Finally, statehood would violate the terms under which the land,
which now constitutes the District, was originally ceded by Maryland
to the federal government.6" Maryland's consent to statehood
would therefore probably be required to avoid a conflict with the
constitutional provision requiring that no "State be formed by
...

Parts of States without the Consent of the Legislatures of the
61

States concerned."
While these arguments might be mooted by a constitutional
amendment granting the District statehood, it would appear that
such an amendment is a practical impossibility. Intelligent, rational
individuals can debate and disagree as to whether or not statehood
legislation would be unconstitutional; it is sufficient for purposes of
this Comment to suggest that statehood does raise substantial
constitutional concerns which severely limit its feasibility as a
solution to the problem of D.C. congressional representation.
Even if one could conclude that the statehood alternative passed
constitutional muster, it (like retrocession) would eliminate our
separate federal district, a result which is undesirable to many
members of Congress and the general public, 62 and which may be
undesirable from a public policy standpoint. 63 This fact, com56 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, d. 17.
57 SeeJ. BEsT, supra note 17, at 70 (arguing that "[a]rticle I recognizes a federal
district... once a federal district comes into existence it has constitutional status").
58 Statehood legislation would eliminate the "District constituting the seat of
Government of the United States" to which the amendment grants electoral votes.
For the text of the twenty-third amendment, see supra note 46.
59 SeeJ. BEST, supra note 17, at 71.
60 See id. at 69 (noting that the land was ceded by Maryland for the purpose of
establishing a federal district to serve as the seat of the national government and
concluding that"ifa federal district is to be abandoned, then Maryland has first claim
on the territory").
61 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
62 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text (discussing why elimination of the
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bined with the constitutional problems previously discussed, may
explain why statehood legislation has never come close to succeeding in Congress. While partisan political resistance to giving the
District two senators also plays a major role, it should be noted that
the proposed amendment which would have treated the District as
a state for purposes of representation, but maintained its status as
a separate federal city under exclusive federal jurisdiction, did
receive a two-thirds vote in both Houses of Congress. Thus,
because of constitutional concerns, politics, and the desire to
maintain a separate federal city, the statehood alternative may never
succeed-perhaps rightfully so. Advocates of national representation
for the District must look elsewhere for a solution; that solution may
be found in congressional legislation which would treat the District
as a state for purposes of representation.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: LEGISLATING REPRESENTATION FOR
THE DISTRICT

The overwhelming congressional approval of the 1978 amendment which would have treated the District of Columbia as a state
for purposes of representation suggests that if Congress could cause
the District to be treated in this manner without needing to secure
the approval of the state legislatures, it would probably do so. It is
the position of this Comment that Congress can constitutionally do
this, and thereby implement its preferred solution to the problems
of District disenfranchisement.
Under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, particularly
those granted in the enforcement provisions of the Civil War
amendments, Congress can simply legislate congressional representation for the District. By doing so, Congress would correct a twohundred-year-old injustice in a manner that is in accordance not
only with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, but also with our
traditions and beliefs regarding a separate federal District.
A. Advantages of the Legislative Approach
If one assumes that legislation treating the District as a state for
purposes of congressional representation would be constitutional
(and much of the rest of this Comment will be devoted to showing
that this is indeed the case), this approach has many advantages
separate federal district is undesirable, even if it would be constitutional).
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which make it superior to both retrocession and statehood.
Legislation granting the District a representative in the House and
two senators would not only provide effective representation, and
thereby solve the problem of disenfranchisement, but also would
preserve the District's separate and independent political status. In
this sense, this solution is very similar to statehood and vastly
superior to retrocession. Furthermore, since the legislative solution
would not eliminate a separate federal district and exclusive federal
jurisdiction over such District (as would statehood or retrocession),
it eliminates any constitutional problem in this regard. In addition,
by preserving the District as "a federal city," this solution is much
more in accordance with our traditions and history, and thus, more
acceptable to the people of the United States and their congressional representatives.
One final and very significant point is that while statehood
appears to have little chance of success in Congress, and while
retrocession is unacceptable to most District residents, legislation
granting representation to the District has an excellent chance of
political success. In 1978 Congress showed, by two-thirds vote in
both Houses, overwhelming support for the idea that the District
should receive congressional representation while remaining under
exclusive federal control. It is therefore fairly likely that a simple
majority in both Houses could be found to approve legislation
achieving the same result. All that would then be necessary for the
legislation to become effective would be a presidential signature or
the override of a veto. Thus, achieving representation through
congressional legislation is not only the best solution for a variety
of practical, historical, and constitutional reasons, but it is also the
only solution with a real chance of political success in the near
future.
B. The Constitutionality of Representation Through Legislation
If the legislative solution to District disenfranchisement is so
superior to other approaches, why has it not been attempted or
even seriously discussed? The principal reason is a widespread
assumption that Congress lacks the constitutional power to
effectuate the legislative alternative. Since it is usually assumed that
congressional representation for the District would violate constitutional provisions granting representation in Congress to the states,
it is also assumed that only a constitutional amendment, such as the
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one proposed in 1978, could grant representation to the District
64
while maintaining its status as a separate "federal city."
The argument against representation through legislation is based
primarily on article I, section 2 which provides, in part that, "[t]he
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States" 65 and on
the seventeenth amendment, which provides in part that "[t]he
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State." 66 The argument asserts that these provisions restrict
congressional representation to the "states" and the District is not
a "state." Therefore, the District is not entitled to representation
and any attempt to provide it, short of constitutional amendment,
would be unconstitutional. Although on its face this argument has
some plausibility, it is ultimately without merit; there is strong
support for the position that legislation granting representation to
the District would be constitutional, given the flexibility of the
meaning of "state" and the considerable powers granted to Congress
by the Constitution.
1. "State" Does Not Necessarily Have To Be Read As
Excluding the District in All Contexts
The determination of whether the Constitution actually forbids
the District from receiving representation must start with an
examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, using the
standard tools of statutory and constitutional construction. There
is a wide and varied literature on how one should interpret statutory
and constitutional provisions and on what factors should be taken
into account. The relative weight individuals give to various factors
often results in their categorization as "originalists," "textualists,"
"intentionalists," "non-originalists," etc. 67
Commentators may
agree that the actual text should be given a great amount of weight,
but most also agree that additional factors should be taken into
account. These additional factors may include the intent of the
framers, the overall structure and spirit of the republican form of
government established by the Constitution, and perhaps some
64 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
66
Id. amend. XVII.
6
7 See Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U.L. REV.
204 (1980) (discussing different approaches to constitutional interpretation and
providing a classification scheme).
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"other principles" including equity, fairness, liberty, and democracy.
All of these have found their way into Supreme Court opinions in
some form at one time or another. As far back as McCulloch v.
Maryland,6 8 the Court acknowledged some of these factors that
should be taken into account in interpreting the Constitution. In
reading "necessary" in the "necessary and proper clause" to mean
useful rather than absolutely necessary, the Court commented that
"[t]his word ... like others, is used in various senses; and, in its
construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person
69
using them, are all to be taken into view."
Using these principles as guidance, the constitutional provisions
granting congressional representation to the states may be interpreted to allow representation for the District. The constitutional
provisions which supposedly prohibit Congress from legislating
representation for the District,70 never explicitly state that result.
All they say is that Congress is to be composed of representatives
from the states. No definition of "state" is given nor does the text
stipulate that Congress may only have representatives from the
states. Only a very restrictive and strained textualist interpretation
of "state," and the constitutional provisions pertaining to the
representation of states in Congress, would prohibit the District
from gaining congressional representation by statute.
Since the Constitution never defines "state," it is not clear what
the term means when it is used in the various provisions of the
Constitution. Certainly, when the founders used the term "state,"
they meant to include at least the thirteen members of the new
American Union, each of which was a former colony originally
chartered by the British crown, each with its own militia and
government. Yet, then, as now, when employed in general usage,
71
the word "state" has a much broader, less concrete, definition.
' 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

69 Id. at 415.
70 These are,

of course, article I, section 2 and the seventeenth amendment, cited
supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
71 The most basic definition of state is "a distinct political society." See Hepburn
v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 444, 451 (1805). The dictionary refers to a "state" as "a
body of people living under a single independent government" or "[o]ne of the
political and geographic subdivisions of a federated country." AMERICAN HERITAGE
DEsK DICTIONARY 908 (1981). Independent nations are often referred to as "states,"
as are subdivisions of nations (i.e. state of New York, the Punjab state in India, etc.).
Generally, when one thinks of a "state," she is thinking of something with borders,
a territory, and a government. Yet, it is clear that, in general usage, there is no fixed

or concrete definition of state.
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It is not at all obvious which, if any, of the entities which would
come under this broader definition of "state" the framers meant
permanently to exclude, particularly in cases where an entity
otherwise fits into the constitutional framework. Furthermore, it is
not clear that "state" was meant to have the same definition in all
72
contexts.
For at least some purposes, it appears that the framers meant to
defer to Congress on the question of what should be considered a
"state." Since "statehood" could obviously not be something that
was limited to former colonies originally chartered by the English
crown, the Constitution gave Congress the power to admit new
states to the Union. 73 Although the Constitution gives no clue as
to what is required of a particular geographical and political entity
for it to become a "state" for purposes of admission to the Union,
Congress has at various times enunciated requirements for statehood. When the Northwest Territories were divided into states,
Congress required a population of 60,000 for each territory to be
admitted. 74 Since then, the three principle criteria for statehood
have been (1) a commitment to democratic principles, (2) resources
and population similar in size to existing states, and (3) an expression of desire for statehood by the inhabitants. 75 Today, each of
the states in the Union was either originally a colony or was
"admitted" to the Union under principles adopted by Congress. In
effect, Congress, not the Constitution, has defined what a "state" is
for purposes of admission to the Union; Congress has made the
determination as to which entities are to be included within the
constitutional term "state," and which are to be excluded.
The District of Columbia, in virtually all respects, resembles the
other states of the Union and meets the congressional statehood
criteria. It has a democratically elected local government, definable
political boundaries, a population greater than three states, a per
capita income above the national average, and has indicated its
desire to be treated as a state. 76 It behaves as do the other states,
72 Indeed, the Supreme Court has taken the position that "state" does not always
have7 the same meaning. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
3 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

74 See Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, § 14, art. V.,
U.S.C.A. (1987).
75 See S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 69 (statement of Sen. Kennedy on
introducing a statehood bill to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
March 26, 1987).
76 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. In November of 1980, District
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performing such functions as issuing driver's licenses and motor
vehicle license plates. While the District clearly meets the congressional criteria for statehood, it was never actually "admitted" to the
Union, at least partially because it was always part of the Union in
77
every way, serving as the nation's capital for almost 200 years.
In sum, given the lack of a constitutional definition of "state," the
broad general definition of the term, the inherent flexibility of the
concept of "state," the congressional definition of "state" for
purposes of admission (which the District meets), and the fact that
the District already acts as a "state" in many ways, it may be
contended that the District should already be considered a "state"
for all constitutional purposes, including representation. 78 It is
not, however, necessary to go this far, nor does this Comment wish
to take such a position.7 9 All that is necessary is to accept that the
constitutional definition of a state is not fixed or necessarily the
same in all contexts. There is no constitutionally mandated
definition of "state" at all; the task of determining what should be
included within the term "state" for various purposes has been left
to Congress and the courts. Given these facts, it is difficult to see
why the text of the Constitution, on its face, precludes the District
from receiving representation.
An examination of the case law in this area supports these
conclusions.8 0 The question whether the District can be considered a state arises virtually every time a constitutional or statutory
provision refers to the "states" or the citizens of the states. The first
residents approved an initiative calling for statehood by a margin of 60% to 40%. See
S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 74 (statement of D.C. councilmember Carol Schwartz).
7 As previously stated, its citizens are U.S. citizens, pay federal taxes, and serve
in the military. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
78 In fact, the Supreme Court has often held that the District should be treated
as a state for purposes of some constitutional provisions. See infra notes 84-100. See
also infranote 101 (noting the position of Peter Raven-Hansen that the District should
already be treated as a state for purposes of representation).
79 Indeed, the District does have a special constitutional status due to the
"exclusive legislation" clause, its unique identity as a federal city, and the fact that it
was never "admitted" into the Union by Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 17.
In this respect, it is different from other states such as Pennsylvania or Maryland.
The relevance of these differences is, however, open to debate.
8o It is the position of Peter Raven-Hansen that the case law goes so far as to
support "nominal statehood" for the District. See infra note 101. In arriving at this
conclusion, Raven-Hansen's article reviews, in some detail, many of the cases
mentioned infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text. See Raven-Hansen, supra note
11, at 179-87. Further discussion of some of the cases (reaching the opposite
conclusion) may be found in Franchino, supra note 11, at 390-407.
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case to consider whether the District might be considered a state
was Hepburn v. Ellzey.81 The Supreme Court ruled that the District
was not to be considered a "state" for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction in federal courts. It did, however, qualify this holding
by ruling that any broadening of the jurisdiction of federal courts
82
to include District residents was a "legislative... consideration."
Although this case is often cited as the primary support for the
proposition that the District is not to be considered a "state" for
most constitutional purposes,8 3 even here, by suggesting that
Congress could consider the District a "state" for purposes of
federal jurisdiction, the Court did recognize that "state" is an
inherently flexible term which Congress has the power to define.
The holding in Hepburn was severely limited by several other
19th century cases. In Loughborough v. Blake,84 the Court ruled
that Congress could directly tax the District in proportion to its
population despite the fact that the Constitution apportioned taxes
in the same manner as representation. "Representatives and direct
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers
....
.85
Given this constitutional provision and this holding, a
strong argument can be made that the constitutional connection
between taxation and representation intended by the framers should
remain intact: since the District is treated as a "state" for purposes
of taxation, the District should be treated as a "state" for purposes
of representation as well.
In Callan v. Wilson, 86 a case involving a basic constitutional
right, the Court held that residents of the District were entitled to
a trial byjury under the sixth amendment even though the amendment, on its face, only refers to states. 8 7 Just a year after Callan
the Court, in Stoutenburgh v. Hennick,88 affirmed that Congress
could exercise its power to regulate commerce across District
81 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
82 Id. at 453. The decision also conceded that the District was a "distinct political
community." Id. at 452.
8 See, e.g., S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 12-13 (arguing that "[t]he word 'state'
as used in Article I may not be interpreted to include the District of Columbia" and
that arguments saying it may be "were properly dismissed long ago by ChiefJustice
Marshall in Hepburn v. Ellzey").
8 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
SU.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, c. 3.
86
127 U.S. 540 (1888).
87
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
88 129 U.S. 141 (1889).
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borders even though the commerce clause only referred to
commerce "among the several states." 89 The following year, in De
Geofroy v. Riggs," the Court held that a treaty between the United
States and France, allowing Frenchmen to inherit property in the
"States of the Union," applied to the District. The Court commented that while "state" might not ordinarily include an "organized
municipality" such as the District, "[tihe term is used in general
jurisprudence... as denoting organized political societies with an
established government. Within this definition the District of
Columbia... is as much a State as any of those political communi91
ties which compose the United States."
The next major case to consider the status of the District came
more than a half century later in NationalMutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co. 92 The Court, by a five to four decision,
upheld a congressional statute allowing diversity jurisdiction in
federal courts for suits between a citizen of the District and a citizen
of another state in spite of the fact that 4rticle I, section 2 of the
Constitution grants power to federal courts only in cases involving
citizens of different states.93 The decision was complicated by the
fact that there was a plurality opinion, joined in by only three
justices, a concurring opinion, and two dissenting opinions.9 4 The
plurality opinion refused to overrule Hepburn, but asserted that the
exclusive federal power over the District granted by article I, section
8, clause 17 gave Congress the authority to permit diversity
jurisdiction in federal courts for suits involving residents of the
District and another state. This reading allowed Congress to ignore,
in effect, the limitation which article III, section 2 seems to provide.
Justice Rutledge reached the same result under a different, and
seemingly more persuasive analysis, arguing for an outright
overruling of Hepburn.9 5 He argued that the District should be
89

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3.

90 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
91 Id. at 268-69.

92 337 U.S. 582 (1949).

93 See id.; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, c. 1 ("Thejudicial Power shall extend
to... Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of

another State;-between Citizens of different States....").
9' The majority opinion was authored by Justice Jackson and joined by justices
Black and Burton. See National Mutua 337 U.S. at 583. The concurrence was
written by Justice Rutledge and joined by Justice Murphy. See id. at 604. The first
dissent was authored by ChiefJustice Vinson and joined by Justice Douglas. See id.
at 626. The second dissent was written by Justice Frankfurter and joined by Justice
Reed. See id. at 646.
95 justices Rutledge and Murphy were apparently unimpressed with the fact that
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treated as a "state" for purposes of article IlI and that the Court
should not "write into the Constitution such an unjust and discrimi96
natory exclusion of District citizens from the federal courts,"
particularly when the framers of the Constitution never considered
the problem of the District, since the District did not exist at the
time of the drafting. "Key words like 'state,' 'citizen,' and 'person'
do not always and invariably mean the same thing."97 The
ultimate importance of this case is that all five Justices concurring
in the result agreed that Congress had the power to give the District
a status for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, which article
III explicitly reserved for the states.
Perhaps the best summary of the current state of the case law
with respect to the District is found in Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in District of Columbia v. Carter.98 The Court used legisla-

tive history to construe the words "State or Territory" as including
99
the District for one statutory purpose, but not for another.
"Whether the District of Columbia constitutes a 'State or Territory'
within the meaning of any particular statutory or constitutional
provision depends upon the character and aim of the specific
provision involved."10 0 It is important to note not only the
Court's realization that "state" is an inherently flexible term, but
also its willingness to look at the intent of Congress as to whether
the District should be considered a "state."
Thus, even though it may not be obvious that the District should
already be considered a "state" for purposes of representation
(although a case can be made for this point of view 0"), it should
the Hepburnopinion was authored by ChiefJustice Marshall. "The very brevity of the
opinion and its groundings, especially in their ambiguity, show that the master hand
which later made his work immortal faltered." Id. at 618 (Rutledge, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
96
97 Id. at 617.
Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
98 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
99 The Court held that the words "State or Territory" did not include the District
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 19853, but did for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See
Carter,409 U.S. at 420-25. In 1979, Congress amended § 1983 to include the District.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
'o Carter,409 U.S. at 420.
101 See Raven-Hansen, supranote 11, at 184-87. Professor Raven-Hansen's article,
written more than fifteen years ago, raises the possibility that the District should
already be treated as a "state" for purposes of representation. However, it seems to
assume that the judiciary can and should do this, since it barely mentions Congress
or congressional power to pass legislation that would treat the District as a "state."
It is, however, extremely unrealistic to believe that a court would do this today, and in
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be clear that the definition of "state" is: (1) not forever fixed; (2)
not always exclusive of the District; and (3) subject to interpretation
by Congress and the courts. Other considerations must also be
taken into account when deciding whether the District should be
considered a "state" for a certain purpose, particularly the original
intentions of the framers. In addition, any legislative action on the
issue, undertaken under appropriate constitutional authority, should
be given great, perhaps determinative, weight. In fact, the cases
discussed above indicate that where Congress has chosen to treat
a state, the courts are willing to accept congressional
the District as
10 2
judgment.
In looking at whether the District should be given congressional
representation, it is useful to consider why it was excluded from
representation in the first place. If the drafters of the Constitution
had a concrete purpose and reason to disenfranchise the District,
and clearly expressed their desires, it might well make sense to read
"state," and the clauses granting representation to the states, as
excluding the District. A look at the historical reasons for the
establishment of the District, however, does not evidence any clear
intent to disenfranchise the District.1 03 Rather, history seems to
suggest that disenfranchisement was an unfortunate by-product of
the establishment of an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction to serve
as the seat of the federal government.
Virtually all sources agree that one of the predominant influences on the founding fathers with respect to the need for a separate
federal district was the Philadelphia revolt of 1783.04 The cirfact, there may be good reason for it not to do so. See infra note 120.
102 In particular, recall the discussions of Hennick, NationalMutua4 and Carter
where Congress did make a determination on whether to treat the District as a
"state." Seesupra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. Actually, Congress routinely
treats the District as a state for a wide variety of statutory purposes, without it ever
being questioned by the courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1953(d) (1988) (interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia); 26 U.S.C. § 6365(a) (1988) (collection of
state income taxes); 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1988) (apprentice labor); 42 U.S.C. § 10603(d)(1)
(1988) (crime victim assistance program); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (1988) (civil rightsequal employment opportunity).
103 Most commentators seem to agree on this point. See, e.g., J. BEST, supra note
17, at 14 ("The intent of the Founders on national representation for the District is
not clear."); Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 191 ("The history of article I, section
8, clause 17, and of the legislation ceding and establishing the District, suggest that
denial of congressional representation to District residents was neither necessary to
effect the constitutional purpose nor desired by those involved.").
104 See, e.g.,J. BEST, supranote 17, at 14-15 ("The proximate cause of the provision
for a federal district was the Philadelphia Mutiny of 21 June 1783."); S. MARKMAN,
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cumstances of this event are well documented. In June of 1783,
Congress, while in session in Philadelphia, was confronted by
approximately eighty unpaid, angry Continental Army soldiers.
Congress called upon the government of Pennsylvania to provide
protection. The state government, however, refused and Congress
was forced to adjourn, quietly leave the city, and reconvene at
Princeton. 10 5 This event convinced the framers of the Constitu-

tion of the need for a separate geographic area to serve as the seat
of government, if only for its own protection. 1°6 However, the
purpose behind a separate federal district was probably somewhat
broader than simply ensuring the physical protection of the federal
government. "The basic concern [was] that the federal government
be independent of the states, and that no one state be given more
than an equal share of influence over it.. . ."107 This concern is
presumably more applicable in today's situation than is the simple
desire to protect Congress from rebellious soldiers. Even though
the vastly increased power of the federal government reduces the
risk, it is still true that if a state had the federal government located
within its midst, it could exert undue influence, or at least have the
appearance of such. It is for these reasons that the "exclusive
legislation" clause was inserted into the Constitution, and why it is
still applicable today.
The need for exclusive federal jurisdiction over the seat of the
national government does not, however, necessarily exclude
representation in the federal government for the residents of the
District. While the intent of the framers to establish an area free of
the influences of any state government is clear, what is far less clear
is what they intended with respect to representation of the area.
supra note 10, at 47 ("Unquestionably, this incident made a deep impression on the
members [of the Continental Congress]."); Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 171
("That the memory of the mutiny scare... motivated the drafting and acceptance of
the 'exclusive legislation' clause was dearly demonstrated in the subsequent
ratification debates.").
105 Accounts of this incident may be found in S. MAXKMAN, supra note 10, at 4647, and Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 169.
106 The history of the debates over the Constitution, in addition to such sources
as The Federalist provide strong evidence of this. See THE FEDERmAIST No. 43, at 272
(U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (remarking on the "indispensable necessity of
complete authority at the seat of government" since without it, "the public authority
might be insulted and [the federal government's] proceedings interrupted with

impunity"); Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 169-72 (citing statements from the
ratification debates).
107 S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 48.
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The question of representation does not appear to have seriously
arisen until the federal government took up residence in the District
in 1800, well after the Constitution had been drafted and ratified.10 8 The reasons for this are summarized by Peter RavenHansen:
First, given the emphasis on federal police authority at the capital
and freedom from dependence on the states, it is unlikely that the
representation of future residents in the District occurred to most
of the men who considered the "exclusive legislation" power. As
long as the geographic location of the District was undecided,
representation of the District's residents seemed a trivial question.
Second, it was widely assumed that the land-donating states would
make appropriate provision in their acts of cession to protect the
residents of the ceded land.... Finally, it was assumed that the
residents of the District would have acquiesced in the cession to
federal authority. 1 9
In addition, the District only had about 14,000 residents, 1 10 a
very small number even by the standards of that era. Given the lack
of real debate or discussion concerning District disenfranchisement,
and the readily understandable reasons for this inattention, it
appears that the framers of the Constitution did not deliberately
intend to disenfranchise the District, nor did they have any reason
to do so. At most, some probably realized that because of the way
in which the government was structured, the District would be
disenfranchised."' Perhaps more importantly, there is no indication that the framers explicitly intended Congress to have no power
to remedy the situation. By the time the disenfranchisement
actually took place, although there were some attempts to correct
the problem, 112 most people, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, were simply willing to explain it away by asserting that
the District "voluntarily relinquished the right of representation,
and has adopted the whole body of Congress for its legitimate
113
government."
See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 172.
Id. (footnote omitted).
10 See id. at 177.
I" See, e.g., S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 46 (asserting that Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Tredwell raised the issue of District disenfranchisement at the New York
ratifying convention).
112 See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 175-76 (describing early statements and
10s
10

attempts in Congress to avoid disenfranchisement for the District).

" Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 324 (1820). This case is
discussed supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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The assumptions underlying the original failure to provide
representation for the 'District and the failure to correct the
problem shortly after disenfranchisement took place, were proven
false long ago. First, the ceding states did not provide for representation. Second, the District's population has grown to a point where
Third, most District residents
it is larger than several states.
certainly do not voluntarily consent to the lack of congressional
representation. 114 Given these facts, in the absence of an actual
intent to disenfranchise the District, it is probably inappropriate to
treat the realization of some of the framers that the District would
be disenfranchised1 15 as sufficient cause to not treat the District
as a "state" for representation purposes. It is certainly incorrect and
even unjust to treat this casual realization as an explicit prohibition
on legislative action to correct the problem of disenfranchisement,
especially when other constitutional authority exists for such action.
What is perhaps more important than the framers' specific
intent (or lack of it) with respect to representation of the District,
is their general intent in drafting the Constitution. The Constitution was drafted to establish a republican form of government
throughout the entire United States. It explicitly guarantees a
republican form of government to every state. 116 Inherent in this
notion of republican government was the idea that the citizens of
117
the nation should be active participants in the political process.
Government by the consent of the governed, through their chosen
The principles of
representatives, was a guiding principle. 118
justice and liberty were also viewed as essential. 119 If equality was
not an essential component of the Union in 1787, it certainly

114 Thus, even if it is conceded that District disenfranchisement was not a major

problem two hundred years ago, it is today. To suggest it is not amounts to a casual
dismissal of the fundamental rights of 600,000 American citizens and constitutes an
insult not only to those being deprived of a voice in the affairs of their nation, but
also to the republican principles upon which this nation was founded.
115 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
116 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It should be noted that the "republican form of
government" clause has been held to be a "political question" which is non-justiciable.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-26 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849). Thus, Congress alone has both the power and obligation to ensure a
republican form of government throughout the United States.
117 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(emphasizing that "[t]he electors [of the congressional representatives] are to be the
great body of the people of the United States").
118 See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
119 See U.S. CoNsT. preamble.
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became one in the years following the Civil War and the adoption
of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.
A proper reading of the Constitution must keep these broad
purposes of the drafters in mind. Construing the clauses granting
congressional representation to the "states" in such a way as to
permanently exclude the District from participation in the political
process completely thwarts these purposes.
Such a reading
transforms the Constitution from a document that bestows liberty,
democracy, and representative government into one that prohibits
it. Given that the text of the Constitution and the specific intent of
the drafters with regard to District representation are far from clear,
it would be plausible to construe the document as already granting
representation to the District. However, as previously mentioned,
120
this result is not necessary for the purposes of this Comment.
All that is necessary is to recognize that neither the text of the
Constitution nor the intent of the framers support a position that
prohibits Congress from using certain of its constitutional powers
to enfranchise the District.
Indeed, such a determination would require a court to rule that this is, in fact,
the case. The few courts, however, which have considered the issue, even indirectly,
have shown an unwillingness to rule this way. See, e.g., Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 444, 452 (1804) (remarking that "state," when used in the Constitution to
refer to the "legislative and executive departments" is only used in the "limited sense"
to refer to a "member of the union"); United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (denying an equal protection challenge based on dissimilar treatment
between federal criminal defendants being tried in the District of Columbia and those
tried in the other states). Cohen is a good example of a recent case which readily
accepts the current lack of representation for the District and the results it causes.
The reluctance of the judiciary to hold that the District must be considered a
"state" for representation purposes is understandable. Such an issue may appropriately be considered a "political question" more suited for congressional resolution.
Although the "republican form of government" clause is the most well established
subject of the doctrine of non-justiciability of "political questions," other issues may
also be covered by the doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (outlining
standards for determining what should be considered a"political question" and nonjusticiable). Given the complex facts of the D.C. representation issue and the lack of
a readily implementable judicial remedy, it could easily be considered a "political
question" more suited to congressional, rather than judicial resolution, particularly
since Congress has usually made the determination whether or not to treat the
District as a "state" in the past. What is important, however, is not trying to
determine whether this should or should not be a "political question," but rather to
note that the courts may consider it as such. Thus, it is entirely possible that only
Congrescan correct the situation and that the courts should and will give congressional decisions in this area considerable deference. See also infra notes 174-78 and
accompanying text (discussing why Congreis may be the more appropriate body from
an institutional competence standpoint).
120
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To summarize, when we examine the constitutional passages
granting congressional representation to the states using traditional
tools of interpretation, it appears that "state" is a flexible concept
which does not necessarily have to exclude permanently the District.
Indeed, the District has been treated as a "state" for many purposes.
The Supreme Court has held that whether the District is to be
considered a "state" will depend on the particular circumstances
involved. In the case of congressional representation, protection of
the fundamental right to vote and preservation of the kind of
republican, democratic system intended by the framers, are
powerful reasons to favor an interpretation which would either
consider the District a "state" for purposes of representation, or at
least leave the question open to legislative action. Only a very strict,
very strained reading of the constitutional clauses would forever
prohibit legislative enfranchisement of the District. Such a reading
is not only out of touch with our traditional means of interpreting
the Constitution, but given the fundamental rights involved in this
case, it is completely out of place.
2. Congress Has the Constitutional Power to Pass Legislation
Treating the District as a State for Purposes of
Congressional Representation
Given the ambiguity and flexibility in the concept of a state,
congressional action treating the District as a state for purposes of
representation should pass constitutional muster. The constitutionality of such action does not have to depend on some ill-defined
congressional power to clarify ambiguous constitutional provisions
involving "political questions" or to correct fundamental injustices
in our system; rather, the Constitution explicitly provides Congress
with ample power to undertake such action.
a. Exclusive Legislation
Perhaps the clearest indication that Congress should have the
power to correct District disenfranchisement is contained in the
exclusive legislation clause which grants Congress power to exercise
"exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" in the District. 12 1
Congress's powers over the District are not limited to simply those
powers that a state legislature might have over a state; they are

121 See U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, c. 17.
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much greater. The federal courts have emphasized the magnitude
of this power on numerous occasions. "The object of the grant of
exclusive legislation over the district was, therefore, national in the
highest sense.... In the same article which granted the powers of
exclusive legislation ...

are conferred all the other great powers

which make the nation." 12 2 It has been held that Congress can
"provide for the general welfare of citizens within the District of
Columbia by any and every act of legislation which it may deem
conducive to that end." 123 Perhaps even more on point, the
plurality opinion in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co. 124 used the exclusive legislation clause as a rationale
to justify the constitutionality of a congressional act bestowing
federal diversity jurisdiction on suits involving citizens of the
District, in spite of article HII which limits such jurisdiction to suits
involving citizens of different "states." In effect, the Court allowed
Congress, under the exclusive legislation clause, to treat the article
M reference to "states" as including the District for purposes of
federal jurisdiction.
The parallel between NationalMutual and potential legislation
enfranchising the District cannot be ignored. If the exclusive
legislation clause allows Congress to treat the District as a "state" for
purposes of article III and federal jurisdiction, then it should also
allow Congress to treat the District as a "state" for purposes of
article I, the seventeenth amendment, and congressional represenation. Such a result would certainly be consistent with the constitutionally enacted policy of allowing Congress to do whatever it deems
necessary to protect the general welfare of D.C. residents. Indeed,
if Congress is deprived of this power, the states will be able to
thwart attempts to provide voting rights to the District, as they did
by failing to ratify the 1978 proposed constitutional amendment. It
appears completely inconsistent with the scope of national power
expressed in the exclusive legislation clause for the national
legislature to be unable to provide basic rights for District citizens
(citizens directly entrusted to congressional care under the Constitution) because of the politically motivated opposition of the states.
12 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539-40 (1933). Presumably, these
"great powers" include the power to admit states to the union and the power to
regulate elections. The role of each of these powers in supporting Congress's
authority to treat the District as a "state" for purposes of representation is discussed
further below. See infra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
123 Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
124 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
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b. The Civil War Amendments
Certainly the exclusive legislation clause has limits, particularly
when the legislation affects not just the District, but the rest of the
nation as well. Although the exclusive legislation clause appears to
give Congress sufficient power to treat the District as a "state" for
purposes of representation, it may be argued that such legislation
exceeds the clause's limitations because it unduly infringes on states'
rights. By treating the District as a "state," Congress would slightly
reduce the power every other state has in Congress. In addition,
this legislation would implement a proposal that the states have
already rejected in their failure to ratify the 1978 Voting Rights
Amendment. To some extent, these objections may be countered
within the framework of the exclusive legislation clause: case law
(particularly National Mutual) suggests that Congress can pass
legislation to protect District residents in its capacity as a national
legislature, even if it does adversely impact the states (particularly
if the "necessary and proper" clause is used in aid of the exclusive
legislation clause). However, even stronger constitutional support
for congressional action of this kind may be found in the Civil War
amendments, particularly the fourteenth and fifteenth.
i. Intent of the Civil War Amendments
One very important aspect of the Civil War was that it vastly
increased national power at the expense of the states; it transformed
the United States from a federation of independent states into a
single nation, where states are just political subdivisions subordinated to a national authority. 125 While the South fought for
"states' rights," the North fought for national power and "individual
rights," most specifically the right of individuals to be free from
slavery. The victory of the North's ideals is clearly reflected in the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, each of which
explicitly gives Congress the right to protect the newly proclaimed
individual rights "by appropriate legislation,"126 even if it interferes
with what might have previously been viewed as states' rights.
"Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of
125 This analysis is also applicable in interpreting the constitutional clauses
granting representation to "states." See supra notes 67-120 and accompanying text.
Clearly, after the Civil War, "state" no longer meant what it once did, nor did the
"states" have the power and sovereignty which they did in 1787.
126 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
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federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty." 127 The
message is clear: states no longer have rights, people do. Use of
the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to grant a fundamental political right to individuals in the
District of Columbia by national legislative action, irrespective of
state opposition, is entirely consistent with the aforementioned
128
nationalizing intent.
ii. Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Prohibition on Racial
Discrimination in Voting
The fact that legislation might be consistent with the general
intent of the Civil War amendments is not, in itself, sufficient
129
grounds for determining that the legislation is constitutional;
the legislation must also be in accordance with the actual amendments. Careful analysis reveals that, indeed, disenfranchisement of
District residents can reasonably be considered a violation of due
process, equal protection, and the prohibition of racial discrimination concerning the right to vote. This is particularly true given
Congress's expanded ability under the enforcement clauses to pass
"appropriate" legislation attacking practices that are not judicially
130
adjudged to be violative of the Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees "due process of law" to all United
States citizens in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.1 3 1 The
132
fourteenth amendment also guarantees "equal protection."
Even though several cases, relying on the language of section one,
have stated that the duty of equal protection expressed in the
fourteenth amendment only applies to the states, 138 courts have
127 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
128 The need for national legislative action, as opposed to the amendment

procedure, was made clear by the failure of the 1978 proposed constitutional
amendment. Allowing the states to thwart a national attempt to expand voting rights,
as happened with the amendment, is directly contrary to the intent of the Civil War
amendments.
129 Although, the fact that the legislation is consistent with the intent of these
amendments might well be considered strong supporting evidence that the legislation
should be considered constitutional solely on the basis of the exclusive legislation
clause.
11o See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's power,
under the enforcement clauses, to identify and remedy violations of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments).
13' See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
132 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
133 See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) ("the District of
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interpreted the Constitution in such a way that the duty of equal
protection also applies to the federal government (and hence, to the
District of Columbia) through the fifth amendment.1 3 4 Thus, the
Constitution provides "overlapping guarantees" of due process and
equal protection to all citizens of the United States.1 3 5 The
question then becomes, can the fact that U.S. citizens living in the
District of Columbia are deprived of the right to vote for congressional representatives be considered a violation of due process and/
or equal protection? It is essential to note that the question is not
whether the status quo in the District constitutes a situation which
can and should be ruled a violation under current case law by the
courts, but rather, could Congress rationally consider the situation
as being contrary to the constitutional ideals of due process and
equal protection.1 - 6 In fact, as argued below, it could, and thus,
Congress can correct the violation by appropriate legislationlegislation granting representation to the District.
The "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection and due
process analysis has long recognized the importance of the right to

Columbia is not a 'state' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954) ("the Fourteenth Amendment... applies only to
the states").
134 See e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 n.4 (1974) ("if a classification
would be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment");
Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 62 n.10 (1971) ("Although no explicit equal protection
clause is directed by the Constitution against the Federal Government the concept of
equal protection of the laws is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954) ("[T]he concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are
not mutually exclusive."). The interrelationship between the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, particularly with regard to congressional remedial powers, is discussed
in more detail below. See infra note 156. At this point in the discussion, all that is
important is that U.S. citizens, whether they live in the District or in the other states,
are entitled to essentially the same legal rights of "due process" and "equal protection."
1"5 In fact, a strong argument may be made that if District residents are being
deprived of due process and equal protection, then citizens residing outside the
District are being deprived as well. If a citizen outside the District is deprived of an
ally because a like-minded citizen within the District cannot vote (or exercise some
other fundamental right), then she is arguably being denied due process and equal
protection as much as the citizen within the District. Also, if two citizens are
unconstitutionally being treated unequally, then arguably neither is receiving equal
protection. Thus, even if we accept that the fourteenth amendment does not apply
within the District, when District residents are deprived of due process and equal
protection, the fourteenth and fifth amendments are still being violated.
136 See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text (discussing congressional power
to identify and remedy equal protection and due process violations).
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vote. The Court has consistently reaffirmed the position that equal
protection will require strict judicial scrutiny where a governmental
policy impinges upon a "'fundamental' .

..

ight ...

explicitly or

implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 13 7 What qualifies as
a "fundamental right" may vary. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause is
not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.... Notions
of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause do change."13 8 Nonetheless, in some form or
another, voting has, for more than a century, been regarded as a
fundamental right.13 9
Perhaps the strongest statement of why voting should be
considered a fundamental right is contained in Reynolds v. Sims,14 °
often regarded as the first case announcing the one-person, onevote principle.
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society... since the right to exercise the franchise in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights ....
[T]he right to elect legislators in a141
free
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.
Given our representative system of government and lawmaking, any
notion of "due process" would seem to require a role in the political
process, absent, of course, a compelling state interest to the
contrary. Similarly, absent such a compelling interest, equal
protection requires that citizens be treated equally with regard to
142
the franchise.
While many persuasive arguments can be made that the
previously cited precedents and principles should not apply to the
District, and thus, that a court should not find the inability of
District residents to vote for congressional representatives to be a
violation of due process or equal protection, 143 the principles
37

San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).

138 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
139 See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (stating that the

"political franchise of voting" is a "fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights").
140 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
141 Id. at 561-62.

142 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15., 395 U.S. 621, 630-31, 633
(1969) (holding unconstitutional a restriction on the right to vote in school district
elections to those "primarily interested" since the exclusion was not necessary to
promote a compelling state interest).
143 For instance, it may be argued that congressional representation is not
required where the Constitution has intended that it not exist. While the Constitu-
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guiding the fundamental rights strand of analysis may be usefully
applied to the District. On a very basic substantive level, when
several hundred thousand persons living in a particular geographic
entity under the direct control of the federal government are
deprived of a fundamental right, the right to vote for congressional
representatives, these citizens are not receiving "due process of
law." In reality, they are systematically excluded from the "process."
Likewise, when these citizens are deprived of a fundamental right
granted to virtually all other American citizens simply because of
where they reside, they are not receiving "equal protection" of the
laws. In fact, denying the :District representation may constitute a
144
form of "geographic discrimination."
Furthermore, several popular academic theories concerning the
proper scope and application of due process and equal protection
analysis also suggest that depriving District residents of the
franchise should be considered unconstitutional. The "political
process" theory, often attributed to the famed Carolene Products
footnote1 45 and John Hart Ely, 146 suggests that the "political
tion seems to envision territories which will not be represented, the situation is much
less clear as to what the intent was with respect to the District. Seesupranotes 103-15
and accompanying text. For a discussion of why the District is not like other
territories which are unrepresented but apparently are immune from equal protection
challenge, see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. Another persuasive
argument might be that equal protection analysis has only been applied where the
franchise has already been granted; since the District currently has no vote, it is
senseless to require that the vote be distributed equally and fairly. Such a point,
however, is more a reflection of how far current case law has carried the analysis
rather than a binding limitation on how far these principles may be carried by either
a court or Congress in attempting to guarantee equal protection.
144 For a framework discussion analyzing when "geographic discrimination" should
constitute an equal protection violation, see Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,
Equal
Protection and Self-Determrination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987). Although Professor
Neuman does discuss the problem of the District of Columbia specifically, he
presupposes the lack of representation for the District. See id. at 352-71. Even so,
some of the conclusions may be relevant to the problem of representation. If it is
true that "[w]here Congress adopts a uniform rule in the states, and a different rule
in the District... normal equal protection principles do apply," id. at 370, then lack
of representation, by analogy, may present an equal protection problem. Professor
Neuman also argues that a policy of always treating District residents as a suspect
class because of their lack of representation would be unworkable. See id. at 355-56.
While this may be true, the argument may be turned around. If the lack of
representation would ordinarily merit treatment of District residents as a suspect
class, and if this cannot take place because it is "unworkable," perhaps the answer lies
in providing representation to solve the equal protection dilemma, rather than in
altering the standard equal protection principles.
145 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a more rigorous judicial inquiry might be required when actions affect
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process" cannot be relied on as it applies to residents of the District
because District residents are a discrete and insular minority
(compared to the rest of the U.S. population) completely excluded
from direct congressional representation. Since District residents
cannot rely on ordinary political processes from which they are
systematically excluded, 147 they are entitled to special protection
under the due process and equal protection clauses. Ideally, the
"defect" in the political process which results in disenfranchisement
should be cured by affirmative government action. Under the
"equality of respect" view of equal protection, often attributed to
Kenneth Karst 14 8 and C. Edwin Baker, 149 citizens in the District
are entitled under the Constitution to be treated with the same
concern and respect as all other U.S. citizens. Depriving District
residents of a fundamental right basic to American democracy, a
right enjoyed by American citizens in the other fifty states, disparages the worth of each and every D.C. citizen, and treats each one as
less of a citizen than other U.S. citizens. Under an equality of
respect notion, this would clearly violate the Constitution.
In addition to the fourteenth amendment, there is also the
fifteenth amendment which states that "[t]he right of citizens of the
"discrete and insular minorities" such that "political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon"
4 6 may not produce acceptable results).
1

See generally

J.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT (1980) (arguing for a

"representation-reinforcing" approach where heightened scrutiny would be required
to protect minorities in situations "where representative government cannot be
trusted").
147 The right to elect congressional representatives must be considered at the root
of the political process. Without this right, citizens lack any voice in government and
have no one who may be held electorally accountable. See id. at 117 (stating the belief
that "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage").
See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (discussed supra at notes 140-41 and
accompanying text). Reynolds, as well as other voting rights cases, shows the Court's
concern
with protecting the vote as an essential part of the political process.
148
See generally Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245 (1983) (arguing for
an "Equal Citizenship" principle where each individual has a right to be treated by
society as an equally respected and participating member); Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendmen 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1977) (same principle).
149 See generally Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive
Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 934 (1983) [hereinafter Baker,
Equality of Respect] (analyzing "the inevitable flaws of outcome equality models and
describ[ing] key features of a preferable alternative, the equality of respect model");
Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality:FlawedInterpretationsof Equal Protection, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1029 (1980) (discussing competing models of equal protection including
the equality of respect model).
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United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United

States or by any State on account of race." 150 It is well known that
the population of the District is overwhelmingly black; in fact,
several prominent individuals have alleged that race has been a
major factor in the failure to remedy the problem of District
disenfranchisement. 151 Thus, it is possible that District residents
are being deprived of the right to vote for congressional representatives on the basis of race. In fact, in order to justify congressional
action, it is not even necessary to show "intent" to discriminate on
the basis of race. 152 There is little doubt that, given the demographic composition of the District, the lack of congressional
representation impacts much more heavily on blacks than whites.
"Discriminatory impact" may well, in itself, be considered sufficient
to prove a congressionally remediable violation of the fifteenth
amendment.

153

iii. Congressional Power Under the Enforcement Clauses
Even if there are reasons why a court cannot or should not find
the disenfranchisement of District residents to be unconstitutional,154 a position that disenfranchisement is inconsistent with due

process, equal protection, and the prohibition on racial discrimination in voting certainly seems reasonable. Indeed, if Congress is
constitutionally permitted to identify situations which are inconsistent with the mandates of the Civil War amendments, this situation
provides one instance where such a determination would be
1r0 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
151 See supra note 6.

See infra notes 153, 171-73 and accompanying text. Indeed, intent is almost
always difficult to prove. In this case it is almost certainly impossible. Theoretically,
in order to show that the District has not received the right to vote because of racial
considerations, it would be necessary to show improper racial motivation on the part
of all those who could enfranchise the District (i.e. Congress, state legislators, etc.).
153 Whether or not "discriminatory impact" in this case actually constitutes a
violation becomes unimportant once we realize that the scope of congressional
remedial powers, discussed in the next section, allows correction of situations which
cause a "discriminatory impact." See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text; City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980) (holding that "under the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices that have only a discriminatory
effect").
154 As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to imagine a court deciding the
status quo to be unconstitutional. Doctrinally, this issue may represent a nonjusticiable "political question," particularly since it is unclear what remedy a court
could implement that would cure the situation and still not violate the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers. See supra note 120.
152
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sufficiently supported by the facts, constitutional text, precedent,
and constitutional theory to survive challenge. Fortunately, under
the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 155 and current case law interpreting them, it appears that
Congress may not only remedy constitutional violations already
noted by the courts, but it may identify and remedy violations using
15 6
any means which are "appropriate."
In both South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 157 and Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 15 8 the Court upheld provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, even though the provisions may not have been implemented to correct court-identified violations of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. In the former case, the Court found that
remedies for voting discrimination "which go into effect without any
need for prior adjudication" 15 9 may be entirely appropriate,
legitimate, and permissible under the enforcement clause of the
fifteenth amendment. In Morgan, the Court stated that to construe
the fourteenth amendment in such a way that
155 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. amend. XV, § 2. Given
the almost identical language of these two clauses it is not surprising that the courts
have treated them in essentially the same manner.
156
As discussed earlier, although some cases have said that the fourteenth
amendment does not apply in the District, see supranote 133 and accompanying text,
due process and equal protection do apply through the fifth amendment. See supra

note 134 and accompanying text; see also supra note 135 (suggesting that where
District residents are deprived of due process and equal protection, the fourteenth
amendment is violated). Although the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments have
explicit enforcement clauses, the fifth does not. This, however, does not present
much of a problem. Congressional authority to enforce due process and equal
protection in the District may be derived from the "exclusive legislation" clause and
the "necessary and proper" clause. Certainly if congressional power with in the
District is "exclusive," this power cannot be ess than the power over the states granted
in the Civil War amendments, under which Congress may only pass legislation which
is "appropriate" for enforcement. If the legislation were only to affect the District,
the exclusive legislation clause would provide sufficient constitutional support. It is
where such legislation affects the nation as a whole, and infringes on state domains,
(as arguably occurs here), that the enforcement clause of the fourteenth must be
invoked. Indeed, Congress has on previous occasions passed nationwide legislation
(explicitly including the District) under the enforcement provision of the fourteenth
amendment. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982); New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (noting that the Civil Rights Act was
legitimately passed, at least in part, under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12 (1977) (same).
'57 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

158 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

1'9 South Carolina,383 U.S. at 327-28.
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would require ajudicial determination that the enforcement of the
state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a
condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would ...
confine the legislative power ... to the insignificant role of
abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was
prepared to adjudge unconstitutional .... .60
Because of this, the Court found that its role "is limited to determining whether such legislation is, as required by § 5, appropriate
legislation to enforce the "Equal Protection Clause." 16 1 The Court
summarized its view of the appropriate scope of congressional
power by stating that "§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
162
the Fourteenth Amendment."
As to what kind of limits, if any, there are on Congress in its
exercise of this power (a concern discussed in the dissent), Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority in Morgan, expressed his view,
often known as the "ratchet theory", in a footnote: "Congress'
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." 163 In other words,
Congress can use its power to increase fundamental rights and
liberties but not to dilute them. The position of the Court in
Morgan has been viewed as controversial and has not won sweeping
support in either subsequent Court decisions or academic commenM
tary. 16
Nevertheless, it has never been explicitly overruled and
remains, to a significant extent, good law.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 165 the Court faced the question whether
a statute lowering the voting age to eighteen was valid. In a five to
four decision it ruled that it was constitutional as applied to federal
elections; a different five to four majority ruled that it was unconstitutional as applied to state elections. Although controversial, the
decision provides substantial support for congressional authority to
both identify and remedy equal protection violations. FourJustices
concluded that under the fourteenth amendment, and under the
interpretation of it offered in Morgan, Congress could "undertake
16

o Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 649-50.
162 Id. at 651.
161

163

Id. at 651 n.10.

164 See infra notes 165-84 and accompanying text.
165 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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an investigation" into whether discrimination existed, "make its own
determination on the matter," and "remove the discrimination by
appropriate means." 16 6 In this particular case, "Congress might
well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was
needed in the interest of equal protection." 1 7 The "swing opinion" in this case, that of Justice Black, was based on Congress's
power to regulate national elections, 168 and on the view that the
fourteenth amendment was primarily concerned with racial
discrimination. 169 Even this opinion, however, showed some
support for the idea that Congress can identify as well as remedy
equal protection violations: "In enacting the 18-year-old vote
provisions ...

Congress made no legislative findings that the 21-

year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise
voters on account of race." 170 Presumably, if it had, the entire act
would have been upheld. Thus, a majority of the Court in Mitchell
did indeed recognize a broad role for Congress in dealing with
equal protection violations.
The decision in City of Rome v. United States17 1 also supports
broad congressional power under the post-Civil War amendments.
In that case, the Court upheld a portion of the Voting Rights Act of
16 6 Id. at 248 (Brennan, White & MarshaliJJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). AlthoughJustice Douglas wrote a separate opinion, he largely concurred in
both the conclusions and reasoning ofJustices Brennan, White, and Marshall. See id.
at 135,
141-44 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67
1 Id. at 141 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168 See id. at 126-30; see also infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing
this power and Justice Black's view of it in Mitchell).
169 See MitcheI4 400 U.S. at 126-30. This view is not supported, however, by either
the text of the fourteenth amendment or other Supreme Court opinions which have
readily applied fourteenth amendment analysis to a wide variety of forms of
discrimination. These include discrimination against particular classes ofpeople, see,
e.g. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds,
a statutory scheme which discriminated on the basis of sex); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, discrimination
against aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down, on equal
protection grounds, discrimination against Chinese individuals), and discrimination
which impinges on fundamental rights, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, durational residence requirements
for welfare benefits which were held to unduly burden the right of interstate
migration); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down, on equal
protection and first amendment grounds, a state statutory scheme which limited
access to the ballot of third party and independent candidates); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-69 (1966) (invalidating poll tax, on equal protection
grounds,
as an impermissible limitation on the right to vote).
170 MitcheI4 400 U.S. at 130.
17' 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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1965 as applied to certain electoral changes made in Rome,
Georgia, as a proper exercise of congressional power under the
enforcement provision of the fifteenth amendment. The Court's
holding that "Congress may prohibit practices that in and of
themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the
prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are 'appropriate ' " 172 suggests an expansive role for Congress in giving actual
meaning to voting rights under the substantive provisions of the
Civil War amendments. Furthermore, the Court's holding that
"even if § I of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any
argument that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting
practices that are discriminatory in effect" 173 bears particular
relevance to the problem of D.C. representation, since under this
rationale Congress could pass legislation to correct the racially
discriminatory impact of District disenfranchisement.
While case law supports a congressional role in identifying equal
protection violations, 174 the exact limits of this role are far from
175
clear and have generated extensive academic commentary.
Many of the approaches attempt to take advantage of Congress's
institutional competence. One application of this theory involves
allowing Congress to have some power to "draw lines" and accommodate competing interests as long as it follows the Court's "value
172 Id. at 177.

173 Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
174 Some Justices have insisted that Congress does not and should not have the
power to determine whether a particular situation constitutes a violation of equal
protection and have, in fact, read the majority opinions as upholding this theory. See
e.g, id. at 221 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision requires
state and local governments and the judiciary to cede more of their power to the
federal government than the Constitution envisions); Mitchel; 400 U.S. at 293, 296
(Stewart,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Constitution
does not confer such broad powers on Congress). The language of the cases,
particularly Morgan, does not seem to support this. It seems much more reasonable
to read the cases as saying that "at least in some circumstances-where Congress and
the Court disagree about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will
defer to Congress' version." Burt, Miranda and Title II: A MorganaticMarriage, 1969
SUP. CT. REv. 81, 83-84.
175 Most of the commentary is directed at section five of the fourteenth
amendment. Presumably, much of what is said is also applicable to section two of the
fifteenth amendment. Even if it is not, however, cases such as City ofRome make the
situation with respect to the fifteenth amendment clearer than that with respect to
the fourteenth: Congress clearly can pass legislation attacking practices which have
a discriminatory impact, even if they are not adjudged to violate § 1 of the fifteenth
amendment.
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preferences" and only works "'around the edges' of the Court's proclaimed doctrine." 17 This approach takes advantage of Congress's ability to work compromises and draw clear-cut statutory lines
in areas in which a court would find it difficult to arrive at a
principled approach. Applied to the problem of District disenfranchisement, this approach would seem to favor congressional ability
to define the District as a "state" for purposes of representation.
Such action, by remedying discrimination and disenfranchisement,
would be consistent with the Court's value preferences (as expressed
in the various voting rights cases) and would allow Congress to
177
make a clear-cut decision where a court might have trouble.
Another application of the institutional competence idea would
require congressional action to be justified by its superior capacity
to find and appraise facts, since Congress is presumably better at
this than the courts. 178 The problem with this approach, though,
is that finding and appraising facts is inherently intertwined with
value choices. In the case of District disenfranchisement, there
certainly are relevant facts which Congress can and should investigate, particularly with regard to the impact of disenfranchisement
on the District. In order to determine whether District residents are
being deprived of equal protection and due process, it would be
useful to determine what they are actually being deprived of
(besides the right to vote). These facts could be used to justify
congressional action. Nevertheless, legislation enfranchising the
District would also involve value choices as well as the relevant facts
which Congress has found and appraised. In fact, the simple lack
of a right to vote (a fact which needs no finding) should be, in itself,
enough to justify congressional action. Thus, although the "factfinding" approach to the enforcement provision would permit
176 Burt, supra note 174, at 121.
177 This "trouble" is evidenced by the Court's reluctance to declare a clear-cut line
as to when the District is to be considered a "state" and when it is not. See supra note
100 and accompanying text.
178
See Cox, The Supreme Cour 1965 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalAdjudicationand
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966); Cox, The Role of
Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,
40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199,260 (1971). The view
is supported by the fact that the Court has, on several occasions, explicitly recognized
a predominant fact-finding role for Congress in equal protection cases. See e.g., City
ofRichmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,500 (1989) (acknowledging that courts

should defer to legislative fact-finding); Mitchelt 400 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, White
& Marshall,IJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that the courts are
"an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions").
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congressional action, it does not seem particularly applicable to this
problem.
Another approach to section five of the fourteenth amendment
argues for a liberty-federalism differentiation that "distinguish[es]
the relative capacity of Congress to draw the lines between national
and state power from the courts' sensitivity to the rights of racial,
religious, and political minorities." 179 It is not entirely clear what
this approach would suggest with regard to the problem of District
nonrepresentation. On the one hand, this theory suggests that a
congressional judgment involving a "liberty" issue which would be
unconstitutional if made by a state, would also be unconstitutional
if made by Congress. Certainly, a state cannot give itself congressional representation; then again, it would never have to.18 0 This
part of the theory aims to prevent Congress from "rejecting a
judicial interpretation of the due process or equal protection
clauses." 181
Yet, congressional legislation enfranchising the
District would not reject any such judicial interpretations. Furthermore, this problem is primarily federal in nature, involving federal
structure that Congress, under the "liberty-federalism" distinction,
should have the authority to solve without state interference.
Indeed, the only reason why the exclusive legislation clause might
not be sufficient authority for legislation treating the District of
Columbia as a "state" is due to the extent that such legislation
would impact on the states. Thus, although the "liberty-federalism"
distinction does not clearly apply to this problem, it easily could be
argued that the theory supports congressional action.
One final approach to section five is an outgrowth of the
"equality of respect" view. 182 This view suggests that "[a] selfdefining, democratic polity should be permitted to pursue or
promote a more extensive equality than that which is required as a
prerequisite to legitimate governance."1 83 This view appears to
come closest to Justice Brennan's ratchet theory: it would permit
policies that pursue an enhanced equality while prohibiting those
that reduce equality below an abstract, judicially defined minimum.18 4 Clearly, legislation enfranchising the District of Colum-

179 Cohen, CongressionaiPowertoInterpretDueProcessandEqualProtection,27 STAN.
L. REV. 603, 613 (1975).
180 This fact makes the liberty-federalism distinction seem rather inapplicable
when applied to the problem of the District of Columbia.
181 Cohen, supra note 179, at 614.
182 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
183 Baker, Equality of Respec supra note 149, at 989.
184 At least some of the other theories concerning the enforcement clause of the
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bia would place its residents on a more equal footing with other
American citizens, thereby providing a "more extensive equality."
Under the equality of respect model, Congress unquestionably
should have the power to correct District disenfranchisement.
In conclusion, Congress ought to, and probably does, have the
power to identify D.C. disenfranchisement as a violation of due
process and equal protection. Mitchell and even more clearly,
Morgan, support a congressional role in situations such as this.
Brennan's ratchet theory (which, unlike other "academic" approaches, is grounded clearly in a Supreme Court opinion) would be well
served by action granting voting rights to' District residents. In
addition, much of the academic commentary, particularly the
"equality of respect" view, supports this outcome. Congress can also
implicate the fifteenth amendment by taking note of the racially
discriminatory impact of this problem on voting. Therefore, under
the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, Congress can remedy "byappropriate legislation" the current
lack of congressional representation for the District of Columbia.
This legislation would take advantage of the flexibility of the term
"state" (and the lack of a constitutionally mandated definition of the
term) and treat the District as a "state" for purposes of representation. This result is not only constitutional, but it is also entirely
consistent with the spirit of the post-Civil War amendments (which
give the federal government a central role in protecting individual
rights and promoting equality), and takes advantage of their
nationalizing effect.
c. Other ConstitutionalSupport: The Power to Admit New States and the
Power to Regulate NationalElections
In addition to the exclusive legislation clause and the Civil War
Amendments, two other constitutional provisions granting power to
Congress could reasonably be interpreted as permitting, or at least
supporting, congressional action to enfranchise the District. Prime
among the powers granted to Congress is the power to admit new
states to the Union. 185 Over the past two hundred years, Confourteenth amendment also aim at an "intellectually defensible argument" which
achieves much the same result as the ratchet theory: giving Congress "wide power
to enlarge due process and equal protection but ... [no] power to dilute them."
Cohen, supra note 179, at 614. In this case, the equality of respect notion comes
closest
185 to achieving this aim.
See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3.
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gress has admitted many new states to the Union, often through
simple legislation. 186 The admission clause of the Constitution
gives Congress wide-ranging powers. Simply by statute, Congress
can grant all the benefits of statehood to a particular geographic
entity; it may define statehood in any manner it pleases.18 7 It
stands to reason that since Congress can define a state for purposes
of admission, it should also be able to define what a state is for
purposes of representation. If Congress can confer all the benefits
of statehood on any particular entity by simple legislation, it should
not be surprising that it also has the more limited power to confer
one of the benefits of statehood (congressional representation) on
an entity which is already part of the Union and "state-like" in
virtually all significant respects.
Further constitutional support for congressional power in this
area may be found in article one, section four, which empowers
Congress to make laws respecting the election of senators and
representatives to Congress.18 8 It is clear that the framers intended the new nation to have "the ultimate power to rule itself and to
fill its offices under its own laws." 18 9 This power has been held
to include the power to determine "the qualifications of voters" and
to "lay out or alter the boundaries of the congressional districts." 19° Given the extensive congressional power over how its
members are chosen, Congress should also have the power to
"qualify," in effect, citizens of the District to vote for congressional
representatives. Because congressional power over voter qualifications is subject to other constitutional constraints,191 this argument in itself may not be completely persuasive. When combined
with the constitutional provisions previously discussed, however,
Congress's power to determine how its own offices are filled
suggests that any doubt should be resolved in favor of a conclusion
that Congress may legislatively enfranchise the District of Columbia.
186 See S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 33 (describing the various ways in which
states have been admitted to the Union).
187 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
188 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Repre;entatives, shall be prescribed in each State... but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations .... "). This
power formed the basis ofJustice Black's opinion in Mitchell. See supra notes 167-69
and accompanying text.
189 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123 (1970).
'go Id. at 121.
191 These constraints include the requirements that each state have two senators
and that representatives be apportioned on the basis of population.
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It appears, therefore, that according to the text, intent, and case law
interpretation, Congress has the power under several constitutional
provisions to confer upon D.C. citizens the right to vote for
congressional representatives, particularly where all that is necessary
to accomplish this is the passage of legislation defining the District
as a "state" for purposes of representation.
C. Arguments Against the Legislative Solution-Why
They Are Unpersuasive
Several arguments against the legislative solution remain to be
addressed. The first argument points to the constitutional provision
that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate." 192 A number of scholars maintain that
"to give equal suffrage to nonstates without unanimous consent is
to violate Article V." 193 This reading, however, is contrary to the
actual text of the Constitution and to the intent of the framers. The
plain language of this provision only guarantees that all states (and
presumably, entities that are to be treated as states for purposes of
representation) will have an equal vote in the Senate. Furthermore,
"the history of the proviso indicates that its purpose was to ensure
equality of the states in the Senate, and not to prevent the 'dilution'
of their votes." 194 Adding two senators from a new state dilutes
the votes of existing states but clearly does not disturb the equality
of the existing states.1 95 The same effect, and the same lack of
constitutional problems, follows from adding an entity that is
sufficiently state-like to be legislatively treated as a state.
Another argument holding little merit asserts that the District
should not have representation because a very large percentage of
District citizens are employed by the federal government and thus,
"[i]ts representatives in Congress would not only speak for a single
interest group, they would vastly overrepresent a narrow constituency.-" 196 This argument is a public policy point rather than a
constitutional argument, and is bad public policy at that. The
192 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
19

'J. BEsT, supra note 17, at 49. See also S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 29-31

(arguing for the same position).
194 Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 189.
195 If it did, the addition of each new state to the Union over the past two
hundred years would have to be considered unconstitutional. See S. MARtKMAN, supra
note19610, at 29.
J. BEST, supra note 17, at 74.
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argument ignores both that many citizens of the District are not
federal employees, 197 and that even those who are have diverse
interests across a broad spectrum of issues. It vastly oversimplifies
politics to say that everyone who works for the same employer has
interests that are sufficiently similar for them to be considered a
"single interest group." Furthermore, although obvious, it is still
worth noting that federall employees are citizens too, and are
entitled to have their interests represented in Congress. In fact, if
one concedes that federal employees constitute a single "narrow
constituency," the argument that District congressional representation would overrepresent that constituency may be turned on its
head: given the concentration of federal employees in the District,
it may well be that the current lack of representation vastly
underrepresentsthis narrow constituency. As a matter of principle,
the employment status of a group of citizens should be irrelevant to
determinations concerning their political rights.
The next argument against congressional representation for the
District of Columbia stems from comparisons of the District of
Columbia with other territories and possessions of the United
States. 198 Since the framers conceived of territories without
representation, and presumably did not see much of a problem, why
should the District be treated any differently? Furthermore, if the
District can receive representation without statehood, why not other
territories? The problem with this argument, however, is that the
District is not like other territories. In American history, there have
essentially been only two kinds of territories: those ultimately
destined for statehood, such as the Northwest Territories and
Alaska, and those ultimately destined for independence, such as the
Philippines. 199 Often, the destiny of the territory is completely in
the hands of its residents.20 0 The District obviously cannot be197 The issue of what percentage of District residents should be considered
employees of the federal government is disputed, but in general, it seems that about
one-third are employed directly by the federal government and two-thirds are
"employed either directly or indirectly in the business of the federal government."
S. MARKMAN, supra note 10, at 58. What is clear, however, is that a substantial
percentage of residents are not federal employees.
19See, e.g., id. at 14 (comparing the District of Columbia to Puerto Rico and
Guam).
199 See Raven-Hansen, supra note 11, at 190 (discussing the difference between
incoorated and unincorporated territories).
Puerto Rico has had two referenda and a plebiscite concerning what its future
status should be. See Colon, The Caribbean,ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1988, at 6; Phillips,
PuertoRicans PoliticalStatus in Limbo Again, USA Today, March 6, 1991, at 7A, col. 1.
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come independent, and it appears it will not be able to become a
state. Indeed, if no legislative solution is implemented, the District
may not have any available avenue to achieve representative
government, denying its residents a choice as to their status. This
outcome is certainly not what the framers intended, nor is it a result
which should be permitted today. The District is different, and it
should be treated differently; legislating representation is a viable
option that Congress can and should exercise.
In many areas of legislation, Congress has treated the District as
a state. 20 1 The Supreme Court has also considered the District to
be a state on numerous occasions. 20 2 Such an approach often
makes sense, since the District is like a state in many ways. It
therefore makes both political and constitutional sense for Congress
to pass legislation granting the District representation in Congress,
thereby treating it as a state for purposes of representation. The
ambiguity and flexibility in the clauses providing for congressional
representation for the "states" combined with various powers
granted to the Congress ensure that such an approach would be
constitutional. By maintaining federal exclusive jurisdiction over
the seat of the national government, this approach presents a clear
advantage to statehood and retrocession. It would appear that
simple legislation is the ideal remedy to a complex problem that has
been with us for almost two centuries.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Comment has been to present a practical
approach to a problem of fundamental justice and fairness which
has been receiving increasing national attention. Legislating
congressional representation for the District of Columbia is the
solution most consistent with our fundamental beliefs and values
concerning the District and the nature of our democratic system as
a whole. It grants fundamental voting rights and real political
power while maintaining the District's unique status as an independent federal city under congressional control. No other solution
achieves this result. Much of this Comment has been dedicated to
showing that such an approach is constitutional. A fundamental
assumption underlying these arguments has been that the Constitution should be interpreted in such a manner as to solve problems
21 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
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involving fundamental rights and the political process, not to create
them. Ultimately, it is up to us as to how we wish to read and
interpret the Constitution. If some, for political or personal
reasons, wish to construe the Constitution as prohibiting a legislative solution to the problem of D.C. representation, certainly
arguments exist to support that position. However, if we really wish
to treat the citizens of our nation's capital fairly, if we wish to
restore to them rights enjoyed by virtually all other American
citizens, we can, without much difficulty, construe the Constitution
as permitting a legislative solution. Certainly, this interpretation is
at least as valid, and probably more so, than the contrary reading.
In short, the Constitution should be construed in such a manner as
to further the rights and values implicit in it; a reading which
contradicts these rights and values and prohibits attempts by a wellmeaning Congress to pass legislation which embodies them should
20
be avoided whenever possible.
The legislative solution also represents a proper exercise of
federal and congressional power. An issue such as D.C. representation is one well-suited for resolution by our national legislature.
From a balance of power standpoint, solving a problem such as this,
which is composed of both complex political problems as well as
constitutional issues, is something which is well within Congress's
institutional competence. judicial deference to Congress, through
a proper exercise of "judicial restraint," allows a solution which
takes into account not only the fundamental rights of District
residents but also the preferences of other citizens of the nation.
Congressional action, since it is undertaken by the directly elected
representatives of the nation's citizenry, also has more legitimacy
than action by the courts. From a separation of powers standpoint,
the legislative solution permits the federal government to handle
what is primarily a federal problem (given the exclusive legislation
clause) without inappropriate interference by the more provincially
oriented state legislatures. :Finally, the legislative solution has a very
real chance of success, particularly since Congress has already once
indicated its desire to settle this problem by providing representation while maintaining the unique independent federal status of the
District. By carefully drafting and passing legislation granting

20' We should always keep in mind the words of ChiefJustice Marshall, that "it is
a constitution we are expounding ... intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
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congressional representation to the District of Columbia, Congress
can constitutionally correct a flagrant injustice that has plagued our
political system almost since its founding.

